Personnel files

The recurring cast

Operational dossiers on the principals of THE TWELVE WORDS — released one file at a time.

Top secretSLASHOperational dossier · as of 2014

Maksym Velychko

Deep-cover operative officer, DIU

Last name and first name: Velychko, Maksym
Year of birth: 1979
Country: Ukraine
Intelligence agency: Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (DIU)
Start of intelligence service: 2004 — recruited shortly after returning from a two-year exchange program at Cambridge; by 2014 — 10 years of operational service, the last 23 months of which were spent in self-imposed exile in the Carpathians
Position: Deep-cover operative officer, DIU.
Area of activity: Illegal intelligence work using scientific cover (paleography, art history, industry consulting) to infiltrate closed circles of elites and collectors; force operations and operational-combat support of missions
Callsign: “Slash”
Aliases used for cover identities: Mariusz Podolski — logistics consultant; Erik Brunner (Brunner) — representative of a mining industry consulting firm; Nicholas Sinclair (Sinclair) — paleography specialist
Appearance and demeanor: A broad-shouldered man whose posture betrays combat training — he holds his back too straight. His face is deeply tanned. In everyday life he wears simple, practical clothing, but for assignments he carries himself flawlessly in expensive suits or a tailored tuxedo.
Professional character and habits: An aikido master (trained under coach Yokamoto). Uses breathing techniques to control emotion and slow his heart rate, and has learned to sense light through closed eyelids. Constantly analyzes his surroundings and calculates escape routes; has a habit of never looking directly at a target if he can observe its reflection instead. Places his own conscience above the chain of command.
Operations participated in: 2005 — Operation PROMIN (“Ray”); 2008 — Operation HOMIN (“Echo”); 2011 — Operation KANYON (“Canyon”)
Weaknesses: Places his own conscience above the chain of command, making him unpredictable to leadership and a potential risk to operational discipline when personal convictions conflict with orders. The cultivated “emptiness” he uses to numb difficult memories and emotions is a control mechanism that can crack under emotional pressure. His combat-honed posture and tan give away his true training, a vulnerability to any attentive observer.

Top secretDOTOperational dossier · as of 2014

Yana Kovalska

Lead cryptographer, DIU

Last name and first name: Kovalska, Yana
Year of birth: 1987
Country: Ukraine
Intelligence agency: Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (DIU)
Start of intelligence service: 2009 — recruited shortly after completing specialized education in applied mathematics and cybersecurity
Position: Lead cryptographer, DIU; foremost specialist in her field; technical analyst.
Area of activity: Cryptanalysis and message decryption, cybersecurity, blockchain, metadata and financial network analysis, technical support for operational teams during active missions
Callsign: “Dot”
Aliases used for cover identities: Yanina Kovalchuk — cover identity as an IT specialist for a commercial firm servicing security systems at hotels and business centers, used to gain access to target networks
Appearance and demeanor: Her face sometimes seems older than her years, marked by the serious expression of someone used to carrying responsibility beyond her age. A small scar above one eyebrow. Ignores military dress code for the sake of comfort during grueling 12-hour shifts — wears an oversized dark blue sweater and sneakers instead of regulation footwear. Slight, remarkably light, almost weightless; her face pale, with fatigue reflected in her eyes.
Professional character and habits: Has a distinctive habit of looking people straight in the eye, as if checking whether the person in front of her matches their file. Her movements are sharp and precise. When fully absorbed in analyzing code, she bites her lip when something doesn’t add up, furrows her brow as if trying to see the code as a physical object, and silently mouths numbers like a prayer. She lives in a world of logic and is convinced that people are far more complex than code, since “codes don’t lie to you about their own feelings when they don’t even understand what they feel themselves.” Beneath her outward spy’s armor, she shows deep human concern for Max, admitting that she trusts him more than any system or procedure.
Operations participated in: Vienna evacuation — sustained a gunshot wound to the shoulder during the critical phase of the operation; 2014 — technical support for Operation ZEUS: analysis of the metadata system for transactions linked to the financing of the private military company “Amadei”; cryptographic support for the team throughout the mission
Weaknesses: Her personal trust in Max exceeds her trust in systems and procedures — a principle that contradicts Yana’s own convictions about the reliability of logic over human nature, and at the same time a potential operational security vulnerability should that trust ever prove misplaced. Her slight, almost weightless build leaves her physically vulnerable in field situations that call for raw physical endurance rather than analysis, as her wound in Vienna demonstrated. Her habit of disregarding military dress code and the chain of command for her own convenience, however justified by results, forces her to constantly prove her competence anew to new or more conservative colleagues.

Top secretTHUNDEROperational dossier · as of 2014

Mykhailo Hrytsenko

Colonel, Head of Operations Directorate, DIU

Last name and first name: Hrytsenko, Mykhailo
Year of birth: 1965
Country: Ukraine
Intelligence agency: Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (DIU)
Start of intelligence service: 1992 — entered service shortly after Ukraine declared independence; by 2014 — 22 years of operational and command experience
Position: Colonel, Head of Operations Directorate, DIU
Area of activity: Direction of agent-operational work, coordination of interagency and international intelligence operations, personnel management and field cover for operatives
Callsign: “Thunder”
Aliases used for cover identities: Mykola Hrynchuk — cover identity as an OSCE military observer, used during early operations in the Balkans (late 1990s); after moving into a command role at DIU headquarters, he rarely resorted to field aliases
Appearance and demeanor: Fully gray hair, deep wrinkles around the eyes, a gaze nearly devoid of warmth — the look of a man who has spent years watching the best-laid plans shatter against reality. In an official setting he holds himself sternly and upright; in private one-on-one conversations, his movements betray the fatigue of an ordinary tired man rather than a hardened colonel of intelligence.
Professional character and habits: Smokes by the window, though he officially “quit” two years ago. Strict about the chain of command, yet knows how to shield his best people from higher leadership. Maintains an extensive secret network of contacts around the world, which he draws on to resolve non-standard situations.
Operations participated in: Late 1990s — baptism by fire in the Balkans alongside future Vienna station chief Pavlo Doroshenko (“Rock”), with whom he has been personally close ever since 2005 — failure of Operation PROMIN (“Ray”).
Weaknesses: An excessive attachment to the chain of command and protocol, which at times keeps him from trusting his subordinates’ own instincts at critical moments. A chronic inability to look after his own need for rest. A hidden weakness for nicotine that he conceals from those around him — a gap between the discipline he professes and his actual behavior. His personal attachment to old comrades creates a vulnerable point an adversary could exploit, one capable of shaking his usual composure.

Top secretCACTUSOperational dossier · as of 2014

Kostyantin Mykolaichuk

Lead technician, DIU operational support

Last name and first name: Mykolaichuk, Kostyantin
Year of birth: 1985
Country: Ukraine
Intelligence agency: Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (DIU)
Start of intelligence service: 2006 — brought on as a technician shortly after completing specialized technical education; by 2014 — 8 years of operational-technical service
Position: Lead technician for technical support of DIU operational teams; responsible for special equipment, gear concealment, and documentary cover for team members
Area of activity: Technical support for special operations: covert surveillance, disguising special equipment as everyday objects, document forgery, preparation of safe houses, driving in extreme conditions
Callsign: “Cactus”
Aliases used for cover identities: Taras Tkach — cover identity as a service engineer for security and video surveillance systems, used to gain access to facilities for installing or servicing equipment
Appearance and demeanor: A wiry man with a perpetually unfriendly look in his gray eyes. His movements are confident, his fingers and hands honed by years of fieldwork. Sharp and prickly in conversation, capable of working with equipment in silence for hours — technology is the only form of “conversation” that asks nothing of his emotions.
Professional character and habits: Manically tidy: every device sits exactly in its place, cables coiled into identical loops, tools lined up by size. Checks every wire at least twice, and every battery three times. Shows concern for his colleagues not through words but through meticulous attention to small details (tailoring a tuxedo to fit, forging invitations) and constant readiness to act. Has a habit of noting suspicious details.
Operations participated in: 2008 — Tbilisi: joint operation with Georgian intelligence services.
Weaknesses: Poor at reading people and emotional cues. An obsessive, almost ritualistic habit of checking equipment — one that sometimes eats up precious time when an instant decision is needed. His outward prickliness and reluctance to express concern in words often lead colleagues to mistake him for indifferent, complicating trust-based communication within the team.

Top secretROCKInternal counterintelligence suspicion — restricted access · Operational dossier · as of 2014

Pavlo Doroshenko

DIU station chief in Vienna

Last name and first name: Doroshenko, Pavlo
Year of birth: 1971
Country: Ukraine
Intelligence agency: Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (DIU) — officially; unofficially recruited by hostile Russian intelligence through financial debt
Start of intelligence service: Late 1990s — baptism by fire in the Balkans alongside Mykhailo Hrytsenko, then a junior officer; since 2002 — DIU station chief in Vienna
Position: DIU station chief in Vienna, Austria
Area of activity: Officially — coordination of the agent network and provision of cover for DIU operations in Central Europe. Unofficially — a double game: simultaneously assisting the Ukrainian team and leaking critical operational information to the enemy
Callsign: “Rock”
Aliases used for cover identities: Official diplomatic cover — staff member of the Trade and Economic Mission of the Embassy of Ukraine in Vienna; Paul Lang — a personal alternate identity he used for covert contact with his Moscow handler
Appearance and demeanor: A middle-aged man with short graying hair and the weathered face of a man who has seen much. Carries the impeccably calm, trustworthy manner of a station chief that keeps anyone from ever thinking to suspect him.
Professional character and habits: Draws on old contacts from the late 1990s to resolve almost any logistical task within hours — able to swiftly obtain detailed plans, schematics, and the like. Meticulously plans alibis and escape routes.
Operations participated in: Late 1990s — Balkans: a joint combat operation with Hrytsenko that laid the foundation for years of personal friendship and unconditional trust; 2002–2014 — twelve years as station chief in Vienna, providing cover for numerous DIU operations in the region.
Weaknesses: Financially vulnerable. Currently under undisclosed suspicion. His exposure is being deliberately concealed so as not to provoke “Rock” into fleeing or reveal to his Moscow handlers that the station chief has been unmasked.

Top secretSANDMANOperational dossier · as of 2014

Marcus Wayne

CIA operations officer, Langley

Last name and first name: Wayne, Marcus
Year of birth: 1976
Country: United States of America
Intelligence agency: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Langley
Start of intelligence service: 2000 — entered service after completing academic training; by 2014 — 14 years of operational experience
Position: CIA operations officer, handler for financial investigation operations.
Area of activity: Financial counterintelligence targeting funding networks, coordination of multinational operational teams, source analysis and handling informants in crisis situations
Callsign: “Sandman”
Aliases used for cover identities: Matthew Hart — cover identity as a freelance journalist covering economic affairs; Ryan Cosgrove — cover identity as an independent corporate security consultant
Appearance and demeanor: Has the distinctive weary look of a man who has spent too many hours on the road; the faint tiredness in his gaze almost never fully reaches his eyes. On entering a room, he instantly clocks the exits and windows. Sharply attentive to small details.
Professional character and habits: Keeps his face unshakable, but betrays inner tension through small involuntary gestures when critical topics come up, or tilts his head forward almost imperceptibly as he prepares to tell the truth. A deep pragmatist: when a situation turns critical, the feigned ease vanishes entirely, giving way to seriousness. Believes that when a source is lost, there’s no point dwelling on it — the job is to work with whatever data is already at hand. A faintly cynical smile is his standard response to stress.
Operations participated in: A parallel, years-long financial investigation that ultimately brought the CIA into intersecting interests with DIU and MI6.
Weaknesses: Despite his professional composure, he betrays inner tension through small physical tells (gripping his cup, tilting his head) — a vulnerability for anyone who learns to read him. Excessive pragmatism and a reluctance to “dwell on losses” after a source’s death can come across to allies as coldness and undermine trust within a team working on emotionally difficult assignments. Chronic fatigue from constant travel risks affecting his reactions during prolonged operations, even if it’s barely visible on the surface.

Top secretMONKOperational dossier · as of 2014

Alex Clarke

MI6 liaison officer, regional station chief for financial intelligence

Last name and first name: Clarke, Alex
Year of birth: 1978
Country: United Kingdom (Great Britain)
Intelligence agency: Secret Intelligence Service (MI6, SIS)
Start of intelligence service: 2002 — recruited after completing service with the Foreign Office; by 2014 — 12 years of operational experience
Position: MI6 liaison officer, regional station chief for financial intelligence (Eastern Europe); Service representative in the trilateral working group “Zeus”
Area of activity: Financial intelligence: identifying and tracking illicit financial flows, covert funding of private military companies, and offshore corruption networks tied to hostile intelligence operations
Callsign: “Monk”
Aliases used for cover identities: Jonathan Whitmore — cover identity as a private banker in the City of London; Edward Payne — cover identity as an independent appraiser of antiques and works of art; Charles Ashford — cover identity as a consultant in fine wines and collectible spirits
Appearance and demeanor: Appears exclusively in impeccably tailored classic suits; favors the strict formal protocols of the Service. A reserved expression and the upright bearing of a man who regards his own refined courtesy as a form of personal superiority over whoever he’s speaking with. His movements are economical, his gaze cold and appraising; he keeps his distance even in informal settings.
Professional character and habits: A passion for good tea — he makes a point of offering it instead of coffee even in the middle of an international crisis, served with impeccable English precision and etiquette. Pathologically hates lateness, treating any deviation from schedule as a breach of discipline. Dislikes settling matters by phone — always prefers a face-to-face meeting. A dry English wit hidden behind a cold gaze; able to read a person like an open book.
Operations participated in: 2011–2013 — financial investigations in Cyprus and the Baltic states: uncovering money-laundering schemes through offshore structures linked to the financing of the private military company “Amadei”. 2014 — participation in the trilateral Operation ZEUS (Kyiv) together with Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (DIU) and the U.S. CIA.
Weaknesses: An aristocratic sense of superiority that can, in the early stages of cooperation, make it harder for foreign colleagues to trust him. An excessive attachment to protocol and formal procedure can slow his response in unpredictable field conditions. Discomfort and a conspicuous aloofness in informal or “dirty” situations atypical of the Service’s desk work. An obsession with punctuality that sometimes gets in the way of adapting to sudden changes of plan.

Top secretMOTHEROperational dossier · as of 2014

Olga Novikova

Director and creator of the secret “Nymph” project (SVR)

Last name and first name: Novikova, Olga
Year of birth: 1961
Country: Russian Federation
Intelligence agency: Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR)
Start of intelligence service: 1984 — entered the service immediately after graduating from the faculty of psychology, at age 23; by 2014 — 30 years in the system, 17 of them as founder and director of Project “Nymph”
Position: Director and creator of the secret “Nymph” project; handler of a deep-cover network of twelve agents; formerly an instructor for first-year cadets at the intelligence academy
Area of activity: Long-term training and management of deep-cover agents raised from childhood; sole control of final decisions through a separate secret channel of communication
Callsign: “Mother”
Aliases used for cover identities: Makes almost no use of field cover identities — for over twenty years has worked exclusively from a clandestine office in Moscow; in administrative paperwork she occasionally appears under the pseudonym “O. Sviridova,” used to separate the paper trail of Project “Nymph” from the official structure of the SVR
Appearance and demeanor: Even in moments of intense strain, she maintains a cold, iron-clad professional calm; inner anxiety betrays itself only through minimal physical tells — a tensely straightened spine, tightly clasped hands, a habit of slowly running her hand across the smooth surface of her desk, or absentmindedly stopping in front of the bare wall of her office.
Professional character and habits: Her core life rule — “emotions cost more than any other currency,” to be spent only in dire need; capable of eliminating problems (and people) quietly, efficiently, without excess emotion or trace. The central doctrine she taught cadets: “weakness always comes from within” — convinced that the project is vulnerable not to external enemies but to the inner weakness of its operatives. Has established a strict rule: the final decision is hers alone to make, believing that the more hands with access to final decisions, the higher the likelihood of error.
Operations participated in: Since 1997 — creation and development of Project “Nymph”: personally selected candidates, oversaw their training, and chose their instructors and psychologists.
Weaknesses: A rare flash of veiled emotion in crisis situations — a barely perceptible tremor in her voice, cold fury, and an unexpressed grief that betrays a crack in her otherwise absolute emotional discipline. Her monopoly on final decisions, concentrated entirely in one pair of hands, creates a single point of failure for the entire project: compromising the network’s director could leave its agents without a command center. Years of isolation from field reality and a total refusal of unnecessary contact may deprive her of early warning signs of problems among operatives on the ground.

Top secretARESOperational dossier · as of 2014

Igor Sudakov

Security officer for Project “Nymph” (SVR)

Last name and first name: Sudakov, Igor
Year of birth: 1971
Country: Russian Federation
Intelligence agency: Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR)
Start of intelligence service: 1993 — entered service shortly after graduating from a specialized academy; since 1997 reporting directly to the director of Project “Nymph” (“Mother”) — 17 years in this role as of 2014
Position: Security officer for Project “Nymph,” a trusted agent of “Mother” reporting directly to Moscow, operating in parallel to and independently of official security; cover identity as an insurance consultant
Area of activity: Counterintelligence protection and preventive control of peripheral assets of Project “Nymph,” personal oversight of project participants, recruitment and retention of support agents among service staff, detection of outside intelligence activity
Callsign: “Ares”
Aliases used for cover identities: Eugène Rocher — cover identity as an independent insurance consultant
Appearance and demeanor: A middle-aged man in an unremarkable gray suit and impeccably polished shoes. His chief professional advantage is an extraordinarily average face: even professional intelligence officers, whose lives depend on remembering faces, are not always able to recognize him right away on a second encounter. He appears and disappears without drawing any attention whatsoever.
Professional character and habits: His life philosophy — victory should be quiet; over the years he has learned never to argue with “Mother” once a decision has been made. Skillfully manipulates people through leverage and pressure. Manically suspicious of everyone. Analytically vigilant. Provocative in pursuit of his goals.
Operations participated in: 1997 — personally oversees the recruitment, training, and handling of Project “Nymph.” Coordinates covert surveillance of project participants. Serves as the “right hand” of “Mother,” the director and creator of the secret “Nymph” project.
Weaknesses: A hidden, fatherly attachment to Calypso, which he himself regards as a weakness. A years-long habit of never contradicting “Mother” has narrowed his ability to act on his own initiative without a direct order from above. His system of control through blackmail is vulnerable to collapse if the leverage suddenly disappears.

Top secretCALYPSOOperational dossier · as of 2014

Marina Odintsova

Deep-cover agent of Project “Nymph” (SVR) · Nymph-1

Last name and first name: Odintsova, Marina
Year of birth: 1989
Country: Russian Federation (originally from Rostov-on-Don)
Intelligence agency: Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR). Agent of Project “Nymph”
Start of intelligence service: 1997 — recruited at age 8 shortly after her parents’ death in a car accident; has since completed a full training cycle at a closed training center; by 2014 — 17 years in the project
Position: Deep-cover agent, participant in Project “Nymph”; officially the mistress of a private villa on the French Riviera, a high-society hostess
Area of activity: Classic work of ingratiation and compromising influential targets (industrialists, EU officials) through personal relationships; gathering confidential information in private conversations; maintaining the image of a socialite uninvolved in intelligence work
Callsign: “Calypso”
Aliases used for cover identities: None
Appearance and demeanor: A twenty-five-year-old brunette with a warm southern tan; hair dark as tar. Slender hands with long fingers. Moves with rare grace. Her gaze is soft, but every gesture is a refined interplay of grace and mystery.
Professional character and habits: 17 years of training. Trained to control every gesture, facial expression, and intonation. Constantly under covert surveillance, of which she is only partially aware.
Operations participated in: A years-long assignment involving the target Dieter Lange — a German industrialist influential within EU leadership, whose influence was meant to secure access to industrial and political information.
Weaknesses: Growing inner doubts about her own role, gradually eroding discipline built up over many years. An emotional attachment to the family she lost. A tendency to seek genuine human contact.